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Abstract—The threat that insiders pose to businesses, institu-
tions and governmental organisations continues to be of serious
concern. Recent industry surveys and academic literature provide
unequivocal evidence to support the significance of this threat and
its prevalence. Despite this, however, there is still no unifying
framework to fully characterise insider attacks and to facilitate
an understanding of the problem, its many components and how
they all fit together. In this paper, we focus on this challenge
and put forward a grounded framework for understanding and
reflecting on the threat that insiders pose. Specifically, we propose
a novel conceptualisation that is heavily grounded in insider-
threat case studies, existing literature and relevant psychology
theory. The framework identifies several key elements within the
problem space, concentrating not only on noteworthy events and
indicators – technical and behavioural – of potential attacks, but
also on attackers (e.g., the motivation behind malicious threats
and the human factors related to benign ones), and on the range
of attacks being witnessed. The real value of our framework is
in its emphasis on bringing together and clearly defining the
various aspects of insider threat, all based on real-world cases
and pertinent literature. This can therefore act as a platform
for general understanding of the threat, and also for reflection,
modelling past attacks and looking for useful patterns.
Index Terms—Insider threat; threat framework; technical,
psychological indicators; attack chain; case studies
I. INTRODUCTION
TO DO
II. RELATED WORKS
TO DO The work presented in this paper focuses on
both developing a framework for the capture and analysis of
incidents of insider threat and defining a method of identifying
common patterns in these attacks using attack steps. The
remainder of this section will discuss the related methods for
the capture and analysis of such incidents, as well focusing on
related approaches for the identification and analysis of attack
patterns.
The CERT project, conducted by CMU [1], proposes a
series of MERIT (Management and Education of the Risk of
Insider Threat) models using System Dynamics to describe the
various types of attack (IT sabotage, IP theft and data fraud).
System Dynamics provide a mechanism for simulating com-
plex environments, through the use of positive or negatively-
reinforced causal loops. For instance, as an employee becomes
disgruntled, the more likely that they will under-perform,
which in turn will result in more disciplinary action, that will
mean that the employee becomes more disgruntled. As a tool
for modelling these intricate environments, these conceptual-
isations can quickly become quite difficult to understand as
the model becomes overly-large [2]. In addition, since System
Dynamics models tend to describe a cyclic process, there is
no immediately obvious starting point for mapping knowledge
to a model, which could even act as an initial challenge for
practitioners.
In other work, Pfleeger et al. [3] present a framework
for describing insider threats and their associated actions. The
framework is based on four key attributes: the organisation, the
environment, the system and the invidividual and is designed
to allow an analyst to question how the different attributes
interact. This approach can be used to classify different threats
by how they relate to the defined attributes. This methodology
provides a useful platform on which to base an initial investi-
gation. However, as the authors acknowledge their framework
lacks the full scope of detail, such as attributes that focus on
the insider’s perspective. Instead, their model provides a much
higher-level overview of the problem space.
Sarkar [4] discusses the factors that contribute towards
the creation of an insider threat, and identifies capability,
motivation and opportunity as the three key attributes that
if an insider threat possesses then they have a high poten-
tial to attack. These three attributes are also present in our
framework, and in addition, we illustrate how an insider may
come to possess each of these through the linked relationship
with other elements. For instance, if it is known that the
individual is highly neurotic (a personality characteristic), are
they more likely to react badly to the news of a demotion,
and therefore be motivated to attack? Since our framework
shows the link between elements, establishing whether such
relationships exist may become much clearer.
The concept of our attack steps shares some similarities with
the pre-existing notion of ‘attack trees’ [5], in that both are
methods that can be used to describe the way in which an asset
may be targeted. Intrusion Kill Chains [6] provide a means of
decomposing an attack into the different phases of intrusion
and are modelled as a chain, to underline the idea that if there
is a breakdown at any stage then the whole process will be
impacted. One of the key goals of Intrusion Kill Chains is
the modelling of attacks with the aim of highlighting patterns
within individual intrusion attemps that can be part of a larger
threat.
Work presented by Schaffer-Filho et al. [7] a framework
is developed for attack pattern recognition, based on the
collection and correlation of cyber situational information.
This approach uses unsupervised classification in order to
idenitfy and compare new attack patterns, as there is often
little knowledge of a new attack prior to its discovery.
Finally, there is already existing work which aims to un-
derstand the attack patterns of incidents of insider threat,
which is directly related to our own work. Mundie et al.
[8] attempt to collect incidents of insider threat to form a
pattern language, represented using Business Process Mod-
elling Language (BPML), which can be used to describe cases
of insider threat. The work establishes 26 patters of insider
threat, using a multidimensional approach so that patterns of
attack maybe easily searched along multiple dimensions, using
faceted classification. Greizer et al. [9] looks to understand
cases of unintentional insider threat that are a result of social
engineering exploits. Their work collects together a number of
cases to ascertain patterns (both behavioural or technical) that
could be associated with the incidents. Kill chains are used to
break attacks down into ‘building blocks’ that can be used to
identify common elements and steps within an attack.
III. SCOPE, METHODOLOGY AND CONTEXT
Our framework for characterising insider attacks was born
out of the need for a better approach by which the various
components of the insider-threat problem could be easily
understood and reflected upon. This objective served to guide
our research and scope the creation of the framework. To
build the framework itself, we adopted a grounded theory
approach. Originating in the field of sociology, grounded
theory has become a popular research method through which
new frameworks, models and theories can be developed, by a
process of data gathering, categorisation and coding, followed
by various comparative and theoretical analyses of findings
[10]. The objective of grounded theory is to collect data
for analysis until saturation is reached in order to develop
a new theory. It is important to note that in grounded the-
ory data-collection and analysis are interrelated and analysis
commences as soon as data starts being collected. To apply
the approach to our work, we first collected a dataset of 80
insider-threat cases. There was no specific inclusion criteria,
thereby allowing us to use cases from CMU-CERT [1,11], the
UK’s CPNI [12] and various news articles (e.g., [13–17]). To
further enrich the theory-development task, we also gathered
as many relevant publications, academic and industry-based, as
we could find (for instance, [4,18–27]); and thus, followed the
more informed theory-generation approach [28] (considering
data, developing theory and then comparing with previous
research).
Starting with the cases, we assessed each one and noted
emerging categories and themes (this was the categorisation
and coding process). An example of a theme that arose in
malicious-insider cases was ‘Motivation to attack’, which de-
scribes the reason why an individual might have attacked their
organisation. As the themes were defined, we also took the
opportunity to analyse relevant literature, both for additional
themes and to better interpret the ones that we were finding.
The next task was comparing and reflecting on the themes
identified across the cases, first for consistency and then with
the aim of identifying relationships between themes. The
latter of these tasks was an iterative process that involved
hypothesising about each potential relationship then validating
that hypothesis with the cases in particular, and against the
literature; we aimed for at least 70% agreement with the data
to support validation. One relationship identified, for instance,
was the strong influence that work and personal events (e.g.,
demotion or financial problems) had on an individual’s per-
sonality state; a link supported by psychology research [29].
Having identified a set of themes and relationships per-
taining to insider threat, we then constructed a diagrammatic
representation – this resulted in the first draft of the full frame-
work. To allow evaluation and further analysis and refinement,
we collected an additional set of 99 cases through direct
[30] means, within our broader research project. These were
assessed and coded similarly to the procedure given above,
and the themes and relationships arising were compared to the
ones already identified in the framework. This proved to be a
very successful comparison, as a majority of the concepts were
present. One insight offered by the new cases, however, was a
greater depth in the potential values associated with the themes
and framework components. For instance, we found several
previously unrecorded events which could trigger an insider
to attack (e.g., loyalty to friends and family, and cultural
pressures) and were also able to further detail the variety of
psychological traits that may contribute to an insider attack,
such as overly impulsive behaviour [30].
A final point about our framework is that, as with all
proposals developed using Grounded theory, it is grounded in
the data that we assessed. Therefore, even though we sought
to be thorough in our investigation and framework develop-
ment, there may be aspects not yet represented, for instance,
influences on threat currently undiscovered. Additionally, it
is important that readers appreciate that our conceptualisation
aims at defining and connecting the various main components
of insider threat, and also, the numerous bodies of knowledge
(in Computer Science, Psychology, Organisational Behaviour)
that are imperative in fully appreciating and studying the
problem. This therefore seeks to define a central component of
the foundation for future understanding and work within this
space. At this stage, we are not aiming towards aspects such as
how the framework could be directly used to detect or predict
insider attacks. Moreover, the proposed framework does not
address practical details on: (i) how live data could be gathered
for framework components (e.g., personality characteristics or
motivation to attack) as part of protective monitoring against
attacks; (ii) how such data would be meaningfully measured
in an enterprise context to predict likely attacks; or, (iii)
how much of an element (e.g., desire for revenge) may be
needed to push an insider to the next stage (e.g., to launch
an attack). These are all very interesting and topical research
problems, but are not within the scope of this current report;
we do, however, for completeness, engage in some further
brief discussion on them in Section VII-A. The next section
introduces the framework.
IV. CHARACTERISING INSIDER ATTACKS
The framework presented in Figure ?? consists of several
classes of component (or element), depicted in four areas,
namely, attack Catalyst, Actor Characteristics (i.e., those of
a potential insider threat), Attack Characteristics and Organi-
sation Characteristics. In the figure, boxes are used to represent
specific elements, while arrows indicate a definite (solid arrow)
or potential (dashed arrow) relationship between the elements.
To assist in our discussion below, we have further broken
our consideration of these areas into the following sections:
Understanding the propensity to attack; Observing behaviour
of trusted personnel; The actor / insider; Dissecting the attack;
and Assets under attack and their vulnerabilities.
A. Understanding the propensity to attack
To explain the elements of the framework and their rela-
tionships, we begin with the behavioural and psychological
aspects relating to the Actor; in many ways, these can be
seen as the antecedents or key initial factors to understanding
an individual’s propensity to attack. The topic of an insider’s
psychology has received substantial research and practitioner
emphasis over the last few years (e.g., [3,19,31]), after being
somewhat overlooked in early enterprise-security work. Based
on our research into these articles and the collected case data,
we identify eight elements that may be especially useful in
modelling and analysing this aspect of insider threats. These
are the Precipitating Event or catalyst, the individual’s Per-
sonality Characteristics, Historical Behaviour, Psychological
State, Attitudes towards Work, Skill Set, Opportunity and
lastly, Motivation to Attack. Below, we discuss these elements
in further detail, and then consider the relationships between
elements; this discursive approach is also adopted for the
remainder of Section IV.
The Precipitating Event is the key event or catalyst that has
the potential to tip the insider over the edge into becoming
a threat to their employer. This term was initially seen in the
insider-threat literature in Moore et al. [32], and has also aptly
been called the ‘tipping point’ [24]. Examples of such events
include employee dismissal, disputes with employers (e.g.,
regarding IP rights), perceived injustices, negative company
acts (e.g., lay-offs), family problems (divorce, child custody
issues, health problems), coercion, new opportunities (e.g., job
offer from a competing company), or even lack of training
in the case of accidental attacks. Research in the field of
Counterproductive Workplace Behaviour (CWB) [26, 33] was
crucial to our definition and understanding of these events, and
their general link to human behaviour and aggression at work.
A significant point that arose from case studies and CWB
literature (e.g., [26]) is that a negative event need not have hap-
pened, as perception or rumours of something bad can be just
as damaging. The case of the systems administrator that began
constructing a logic bomb based on rumours of lower bonuses
is a perfect example [1, p. 257]). Moreover, being mindful
of only employees’ work-related activities might result in
missing other events that could be the catalyst for attacks.
Similarly, as accidental attacks become more detrimental to
the enterprise [34], there will be a growing need to understand
better how they come about, and the related tipping points.
Generally, however, this Event element reflects the need for
better appreciation of the range of events that could set an
insider along the path to an attack.
Personality Characteristics, including psychological traits
and dispositions, capture the features of an Actor’s personality
based both on their innate self (thus, the static aspects) and
their life experiences (therefore, the more responsive and dy-
namic aspects). General personality traits can include OCEAN
(Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness,
Neuroticism) [35], the Dark Triad (Machiavellianism, nar-
cissism and psychopathy) [36], and sensation-seeking [33].
Other Characteristics may include: maturity, aggressiveness,
self-esteem, social-skill problems, personal integrity, and su-
perficiality [19, 37].
As they pertain to insider threat, Characteristics are central
to how we as humans think and act, and therefore have a
strong influence on whether or not an individual is likely to
get involved in malicious activities or threatening behaviour
at work (be it intentional or unintentional). Our cases high-
lighted the importance of this, especially the impact that
Characteristics may have on future actions. We were able to
identify Characteristics as being a factor in many of the cases,
and validated the associated relationship against behaviours
using literature. Personality traits such as Machiavellianism,
excitement-seeking, and narcissism were found to relate to
insider threats and antisocial behaviour [19,33,38]. Likewise,
from an accidental-threat perspective, personality traits such
as OCEAN (especially, agreeableness and openness) relate
closely with an individual’s susceptibility to scams [39].
It is important to understand, however, that although some
Characteristics are worthy of note, they cannot be considered
in isolation (e.g., to identify a potential attacker). Instead, we
need to assess clusters of Personality Characteristics together
with catalysts (Precipitating Events) and even the individual’s
environment. For example, an employee who is highly nar-
cissistic, in some cases might be the perfect choice for a
particular role in an organisation; however, in combination
with a stressful event (e.g., being over-looked for a job
promotion) or opportunity (e.g., being offered a new job with
better benefits), this may lead to a specific psychological
state which then results in an increased risk being posed
to the organisation. Aldrich Ames, for instance, reportedly
suffered from a narcissistic personality disorder which lead
him to “believe he was bulletproof” [40], a likely factor in
his espionage. As mentioned above, personality clusters might
also be useful to consider. For example, an individual who
scores high on all three personality traits that constitute the
Dark Triad would, theoretically, pose a greater threat than
those who do not.
Historical Behaviour documents the kinds of activities the
Actor has engaged in during the past and, as with most be-
Fig. 1. ‘Propensity to attack’ elements
haviour, is likely to be influenced by their Personality Charac-
teristics. There are, of course, an infinite range of behaviours,
but from a malicious, insider-threat perspective, examples of
notable behaviours include: addictive practices (e.g., gambling
or alcohol abuse), previous rule violations (e.g., harassment
or company policy violations), criminal history, or a history
of serious mental problems. Of course, when considered in
isolation, this again is not solely-indicative of an individual be-
coming an insider threat. For unintentional threats, behaviours
discovered to be relevant were typically as a result of human
error (e.g. carelessness or absent-mindedness) [41].
Overall, many of the above are therefore linked to the
person’s personality. A CMU-CERT case [1, p. 257] illustrates
this element’s importance, when a system administrator with a
history of electronic crimes used similar malicious techniques
to attack his employer, first using blackmail and then sabotage.
Thus, suggesting that past actions have some influence on
future actions – a point further supported by CWB literature
[42]. There is the argument that if proper checks had been con-
ducted beforehand then appropriate measures could have been
taken. Yet, to actually conduct such checks may be challenging
given the mobility of today’s workforce, and companies may
not have the resources available to perform such extensive
investigations. Either way, it remains a significant factor in
understanding (if not necessarily diagnosing) insider attacks.
Psychological State represents the Actor’s psychological
and emotional state (e.g., happy, depressed, stressed or anx-
ious). This might be, in part, due to their psychological make-
up (e.g., some individuals have biological depression), or as
a result of their environment (e.g., a stressful event, such as
forced job transfer, which leads to depression [29]), which
therefore explains the relationships to Personality Characteris-
tics and Precipitating Event respectively. If the environment
causes the state it might arise from an event outside the
workplace, or from within it. In the insider-threat literature, it
is commonly a disgruntled employee responsible for attacks;
but disgruntlement is only one of a list of states found to be
a compelling precursor in our case research. Others include
stress, fear (e.g., of dismissal or group exclusion), a lack
of appreciation, a feeling of entitlement (to customer contact
data for instance), feeling opportunistic, or, from an accidental
threat perspective, carelessness, boredom or dissatisfaction.
Further insight was also attained from the research on
CWB, where several other Psychological States of concern
can be found which have validated relationships with counter-
productive behaviours such as, perceptions of organisational
injustice, workplace inequalities, and revenge cognitions [26].
An interesting point here is that like the Precipitating Event,
the Actor’s state can be influenced just by opportunities that
present themselves. For example, in one case [1, p. 272]
the system administrator happened to find several unprotected
files on an FTP server, an opportunity too great to pass
up, as he later cracked the encrypted passwords in the files,
thereby gaining unauthorised access to an extensive amount
of customer data. Although undocumented, it is plausible that
certain traits or experiences in his background (e.g., impulsive
behaviour) combined with the Event then provoked him to
seize the opportunity and act maliciously.
Motivation to Attack captures the reason that an Actor might
desire to attack the enterprise. The notion of attack motivation
is well understood in the threat-assessment field and therefore,
in addition to case reflection, we drew heavily on existing
work [25] for our general categories. Namely, motivations can
be: financial, political, for revenge, curiosity or fun, power,
competitive advantage, or peer recognition. Based on our
case findings, we posit that an Actor’s current Psychological
State would be a significant influence on their Motivation to
Attack. For instance, a contractor’s disgruntlement because of
mistreatment might give rise to some desires for revenge; or,
fear of being excluded from the office ‘in crowd’ or loyalty
to friends/family/country [12] may motivate an employee to
engage in an attack (not dissimilar to the situation with theft in
Greenberg and Barling [43]). This general State-to-Motivation
relationship was also apparent when reflecting on the related
CWB literature, especially as it relates to anger, frustration
and various perceptions (e.g., of unfairness or injustice) [26].
Interestingly, Psychological State can also be coupled with
Attitude towards Work in its influence on Motivation. For
example, if an employee was constantly overlooked for a
promotion, therefore possibly feeling aggrieved (Psychological
State), he might feel that the strong commitment to his
employer (Attitude) might be misplaced, and hence become
highly motivated to attack. This idea, albeit anecdotal at this
stage, ties in closely with existing work on the individual
relationships, from State to Motivation [26] and Attitude to
Motivation [27]. For this Motivation element, we also consider
the possibility of accidental insider attacks. To describe these,
we maintain two overarching classifications of motivation,
one ‘deliberate’ (capturing the categories above) and one
‘accidental’ (to accommodate human factors, mistakes, etc.).
This ensures that our framework is inclusive enough to capture
all types of threats.
Skill-Set captures the Actor’s capability or the requisite
skills needed to conduct an attack [25]. Arguably it is reason-
able to make the link between the role that an Actor carries
out, within an enterprise, and the skill-set that they possess;
although there is certainly scope for a skill set outside of a job
role. This is highlighted by a CMU-CERT case [1, p. 253]:
a software developer at an organisation who was angry at
the lack of company bonuses inserted malicious code into the
enterprise’s premier product, an inter-network communication
interface. In this instance it was the employee’s software-
development background and associated development skill that
allowed him to initiate and carry out the attack.
Opportunity captures the Actor’s chance to initiate an attack
on the enterprise. The notion of the opportunity to attack
is well defined within related literature relating to threat-
assessment and risk management. Clearly, in order for an
Actor to carry out a malicious attack on an organisation,
they will need an opportunity to initiate the attack [25]. For
example, CMU-CERT present the case [1, p. 266] of an
insider, employed by the police, to communicate information
about drivers’ licenses. The insider was then recruited by a
third-party to provide license information, and later progressed
to creating fraudulent licenses. The opportunity in this case
was the insider’s authorised access to the license database;
without this access, the attack could not have taken place.
The progression from Psychological State to Motivation to
Attack is one stage in particular where employers (via the
Human Resources (HR) department or security practitioners)
could step in and address potentially negative states (e.g.,
observed feelings of anger, dissatisfaction, or irresponsibility)
before the individual becomes motivated to attack. This could
mean HR meeting with the employee to discuss and correct
any misunderstandings in a more relaxed manner, offering
additional support if an employee is going through personal
problems, or from a more technical perspective, changing
policies, or implementing new security measures meant to
deter thoughts of attack.
B. Observing behaviour of trusted personnel
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Fig. 2. Behaviour elements
Two areas that are key to understanding and modelling
insider attacks are observations about an Actor’s Physical and
Cyber behaviour. Observ d Physical Behaviour captures the
actual physical behaviour that may have been exhibited by an
Actor, for example in the office, with colleagues or accessing
buildings and resources. Observed Cyber Behaviour places the
focus on the technologically-related behaviour that an Actor
may exhibit over the enterprise information infrastructure, such
as the usage of Internet, e-mail, and workstations. Both of
the observed sets of behaviour may be indicative of an attack
either currently being conducted, or soon to be conducted.
Moore et al. [32] propose similar aspects in their analysis
of insider threats, explicitly naming them behavioural and
technical precursors. Many of these can also be seen in work
by the FBI [15]. In our research, we are compiling (as far as
possible) a comprehensive list of behaviours that will be of
interest when trying to understand insider threats.
For the physical domain, examples of potentially concerning
behaviours include: assaulting or intimidating co-workers,
clients or business partners, expressing a negative attitude
towards the company, violating company policy, and poor job
performance. On the other hand, concerning cyber behaviour
includes: violating technology usage policies, attempts to gain
access to data of systems beyond their job’s responsibilities,
and deactivating security tools. In terms of relationships, all
these behaviours may be influenced by a person’s Traits and
Historical Behaviour. In the first case, the type of person some-
one is can undoubtedly influence their actions, while in the
second case, although not inevitable, previous behaviour does
often reoccur, potentially because of the link to personality.
It is important to remember that observing precursor be-
haviours in isolation may not necessarily be indicative of
an insider attack. Whilst some behaviours may clearly be
directly-related to an attack (e.g., breaking into a safe), other
behaviours may require a more holistic view of the inter-play
with related factors from our framework to establish whether
an attack is present.
C. The actor
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Fig. 3. Actor elements
In Section I we defined the concept of an insider within
an organisation. The Actor element within our framework
is used to define a number of generic types of individual
that could be considered as part of an insider attack (using
the definition provided in Section I). The types of individual
we have identified are: employee, contractor or consultant,
client or customer, joint venture partner, vendor and external
attacker; most of these individuals represent positions held by
trusted personnel, with the exception of an external attacker.
The external attacker is included in this list because of the fact
that individuals that are external to an organisation may recruit
and collaborate with any of the trusted personnel to assist in
conducting an attack against the enterprise. This collaboration
could be voluntary (e.g. mutual desire for financial gain),
coerced (e.g. blackmail) or unknowing (e.g. as a result of a
phishing or social-engineering attack).
We make the assumption that an Actor is innocent until
proven otherwise, and so there may or may not be a Motivation
for Attack. This list of types of individuals who can be
considered insiders is by no means novel, but it should serve
to stress the fact that employees are not a company’s only
concern. There have been several documented attacks (e.g.,
CMU-CERT [1, pp. 248, 269, 271]) originating from a variety
of trusted third parties, sometimes with much higher privileged
access than the average employee.
The State of Relationship and Enterprise Role are directly
related to the Actor. The first identifies the current state of
the relationship between the enterprise and the Actor, while
the second captures the role that the Actor may have in the
enterprise. There are four states of relationship which we
distinguish: current, former, serving notice and temporary.
Although people in any of these states may be dangerous
to an organisation, cases have shown that individuals in the
last three states may e especially risky. In several cases for
example, Actors serving notice, especially those that work with
sensitive information, are of significant concern because they
may attempt to take it with them to boost their value to a
competing organisation. The types of Enterprise Role vary
considerably but knowledge of an Actor’s role is useful as
certain roles have been shown to tend towards specific attacks,
with set attack objectives in mind. According to Cappelli et
al. [1], for instance, scientists, engineers, programmers and
salespeople are typically the roles that steal IP, and usually for
the purposes of setting up their own business, carrying to a
new job, or giving to foreign organisations or governments.
D. Dissecting the attack
Attack Objective 
e.g., Sabotage 
company  
Attack Step 
e.g., Hack into  
company server 
Attack 
e.g., Plant and 
execute logic 
bomb 
Attack Step Goal 
e.g., Access 
restricted area 
Fig. 4. Attack elements
An Attack represents an activity that is conducted by an
Actor, either deliberately or accidentally, that will have a
negative impact on the enterprise. The Attack will typically
have a result associated with it, i.e. an Attack Objective. An
example of an Attack is, a former IT administrator planting and
executing a logic bomb on his previous employer’s network;
while the objective, in this case, may be sabotage. There are a
large array of possible attacks, especially when considering the
disparate areas of sabotage, IP theft and fraud, and therefore
we will not seek to enumerate them in this article; these will,
however, be available at some point on our site [44].
Attack Objectives are much more constrained, and tend
to consist of: financial gain, personal gain, competitive gain,
political gain and damage to the organisation. Objectives, as
one would expect, are usually closely tied with the motivations
behind the threat. For instance, desire for revenge usually leads
to an attack seeking personal gain or to damage the company.
In the case where an attack is accidental or unintentional, we
consider the Objective to be task or activity that is the reason
for the incident. Therefore, having to complete a task at work
under strict time constraints could be the Objective that was
the reason for an employee taking a USB stick with sensitive
data home, which was later lost during their commute. By
modelling accidental threats in this way, we are able to gain
further insight into the reasons linked to attacks, and thus
facilitate better understanding.
While Attacks aim to be generic, Attack Steps define, in
detail, the specific activities undertaken to conduct the attack.
As such, an Attack can be composed of several chained Steps.
To steal sensitive IP, an insider threat may: (i) determine which
of their colleagues has the credentials to access the desired
IP (reconnaissance); (ii) coerce those individuals possibly
via financial means, charm or physical threats to assist in
the task; (iii) use the ill-gotten credentials to access the IP;
(iv) download the IP to portable media; and (v) delete the
related log files. These Attack steps can also be thought of
in terms of the value gained from each step, namely, the
Attack Step Goal. Thus, for the steps above, we would have:
(i) gathering intelligence; (ii) recruiting accomplices; (iii)
accessing restricted data; (iv) exfiltration of a volume of data;
and finally (v) covering tracks. We believe that these goals
can be particularly helpful when discussing the insider-threat
problem with top management, and effectively communicating
the attack, inclusive of what would be gained through each
step, without going into excessive technical detail.
Attacks Steps share some similarity with the pre-existing
notion of Attack Trees [5], in that, both methods can describe
how a particular target or asset might be attacked. The value
of our Attack Steps is that they allow for the clear sequencing
and ordering of actions. An Attack Tree is typically used to
model threats to a resource and abstracts from the sequence
of actions necessary. We envisage that this added value with
Steps is particularly useful when it comes to applying our
framework to understand and assess an insider attack.
The idea of Intrusion Kill Chains [6] has particular relevance
when considering our Attack Steps. These Kill Chains provide
a means of describing the different phases of an intrusion
and are modelled as a chain to emphasise the idea that if
there is a breakdown at any one stage then the entire process
is disrupted. Intrusion Kill Chains are designed to model
attacks, with the aim of highlighting patterns within individual
intrusions and how they may fit into part of a larger threat. It
is easy to imagine how a similar aim could be achieved using
our Attack Steps; when enough attacks have been collected
and modelled then they could be used to establish common
Attack Steps. The concept of building a library of Attack Steps
is similar to the idea of Common Attack Pattern Enumeration
and Classification (CAPEC) [45]. Attacks are recorded, in a
similar fashion to our Attack Steps, and then CAPEC is used
to identify opportunities for increasing the ‘robustness and
defendability’ of software.
Figure 5 shows an example sequence of Attack Steps within
an Attack, and highlights the strong sense of ordering within
the attack. All steps at the same level in an Attack Tree are
essentially in parallel, and so do not preserve any ordering.
Figure 5 highlights an idea of concurrency in our Attack Steps,
as the initial stage of the attack sees the Actor both developing
a relationship with a rival company while at the same time
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Fig. 5. Attack Steps
gathering company secrets and IP in tandem. This example
of Attack Steps can than be followed through, sequentially, to
the IP being copied and finally the Actor editing and deleting
log files in order to cover up the evidence of their attack.
E. Assets under attack and their vulnerabilities
The last two classes of element are Assets items of
value to the enterprise and of interest to the threat (e.g.,
company data, hardware, and personnel) and Vulnerabilities
weaknesses in assets or controls protecting them (e.g., weak
passwords on administrative accounts, unpatched Web servers,
and inadequate building security).
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Fig. 6. ‘Assets and vulnerability’ elements
These are well-understood and frequently modelled aspects,
and therefore are not covered in any detail here; Jones and
Ashenden [25] offer further insight. In the framework, we
link these elements to Attack Steps instead of to the Attack,
in order to allow a more detailed definition of the assets and
vulnerabilities associated with each attack step. The advantage
for a security practitioner with this configuration is the ability
to see exactly what assets may be or have been targeted by
each step of an attack, and the respective vulnerabilities that
could be or were exploited. With the theft of IP example
above, assets targeted were personnel, data, access credentials
and log files, while vulnerabilities included a lack of security-
awareness training and employee support, failure to monitor
or block portable-media downloads, and inadequate protection
of sensitive files. If conducting an investigation into a line of
potential insider attacks after the fact, the way we define the
attack steps could also allow an analyst to spot patterns, for
example, certain assets usually being targeted or vulnerabilities
exploited en route to more comprehensive attacks.
The various elements and relationships described in this
section allows us to bring together precipitating events, in-
dividual’s personality traits (and predispositions), behaviours
(both historic and current), enterprise states and roles, attacks
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Fig. 7. Applying the framework to Case 1
(and their detailed steps and goals) and targeted assets. With
this framework, we can begin to characterise insider attack as
we illustrate farther below.
V. IDENTIFYING PATTERNS OF ATTACKS
Identifying patterns of attacks can be extremely helpful,
as these patterns can provide the framework for combining
different features and anomaly metrics, and set the context for
understanding anomalous behaviour. In order to develop the
patterns of attacks we collected and studied a data-set of more
than 100 insider-threat cases. There was no specific inclusion
criteria, thereby allowing us to use cases from CMU-CERT
[1, 11] , the UK’s CPNI [12] and various news articles (e.g.,
[13–17]). We adopted a grounded-theory approach to analyse
the case studies. Originating in the field of sociology, grounded
theory has become a popular research method through which
new frameworks, models and theories can be developed, by a
process of data-gathering, categorisation and coding, followed
by various comparative and theoretical analyses of findings
[10]. The objective of grounded theory is to collect data
for analysis until saturation is reached in order to develop
a new theory. It is important to note that in grounded the-
ory data-collection and analysis are interrelated and analysis
commences as soon as data starts being collected. To further
enrich the theory-development task, we also gathered as many
relevant publications - academic or industry-based - as we
could find (for instance, [4, 18–27]), and thus followed the
more informed theory-generation approach [28] (considering
data, developing theory and then comparing with previous
research).
A. De-constructing the case studies
To apply the ground theory approach to our goal we
established the notions of attack steps, which once combined
describe specific attacks. Attack steps define, in detail, the
specific activities undertaken to conduct an attack. As such, an
attack can be composed of several chained steps. Deriving the
attack steps was an iterative process. Initially we assessed each
one of the case studies and noted the emerging attack steps.
The next task was to revisit the steps and group together those
that had similar meaning. This process was repeated several
times until we crystallised our interpretation of the attack-steps
descriptions and no more reductions and groupings could be
made. The full spectrum of the attack steps identified in the
case studies can be found on the Appendix ?? section.
As an example of how attack steps emerge from case
studies, consider an IP theft scenario. To steal sensitive IP,
an insider threat may: (i) determine which of their colleagues
has the credentials to access the desired IP (reconnaissance);
(ii) coerce those individuals - possibly via financial means,
charm or physical threats - to assist in the task; (iii) use the
ill-gotten credentials to access the IP; (iv) download the IP to
portable media; and (v) delete the related log files. Each of
these five detailed activities would be captured as an atomic
attack step.
Attacks steps share some similarity with the pre-existing
notion of ‘attack trees’ [5], in that both methods can describe
how a particular target or asset might be attacked. The value of
our attack steps is that they allow for the clear sequencing and
ordering of actions. The idea of Intrusion Kill Chains [6] has
particular relevance when considering our attack steps. These
kill chains provide a means of describing the different phases
of an intrusion and are modelled as a chain to emphasise the
idea that if there is a breakdown at any one stage then the
entire process is disrupted. Intrusion Kill Chains are designed
to model attacks, with the aim of highlighting patterns within
individual intrusions and how they may fit into part of a
larger threat. It is easy to imagine how a similar aim could
be achieved using our attack steps; when enough attacks
have been collected and modelled then they could be used
to establish common attack steps. The concept of building a
library of attack steps is similar to the idea of Common Attack
Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [45]. Attacks
are recorded there in a similar fashion to our attack steps, and
then CAPEC is used to identify opportunities for increasing
the ‘robustness and defendability’ of software.
B. Developing attack patterns
Defining the attack steps was the first step towards iden-
tifying attack patterns, the next and most decisive was to
reconstruct the case studies as a chain of attack steps. We
studied all the case studies related to fraud and IP theft, and
based on the narrative of each case study we developed the
corresponding chain of attack steps. We then started forming
attack patterns by following the attack tree paradigm. In an
attack tree, its root comprises the end-goal of the attacker, the
nodes represent intermediary steps to achieve the goal and the
leaves of the trees are the initial steps of an attacker. Following
this convention, we grouped together all the chains of case
studies that ended with the same attack step. The final attack
step was the the root of our attack-pattern tree. We then placed
all the steps prior to the final on the first level of the tree and
recorded in how many cases these attack steps occurred. We
applied the same process to all the attack steps in the chain
until we had an attack tree where leaf nodes were in various
layers of the tree. In the case where the same attack step was
found in different lengths of the chain, we would place this
step in the farthest layer from the root. For example, if an
attack step was fourth in the chain of events of an attack in
one case study and fifth in another, we would place the attack
step in the fifth layer of the attack tree.
The depth of each attack-pattern tree is equal to the maxi-
mum length of the grouped case studies. The attacks, however,
do not necessarily have to start at the same layer. This is either
due to lack of information from the case studies, where some
omitted information pertaining to how the attack originated,
or due to the different privileges and roles that the attackers
have, rendering some of the steps irrelevant. For example an
employee who has no access to a data base, will seek to
upgrade his privileges before being able to download data,
whereas an IT administrator with access credentials will omit
this step.
This mismatch of layers where the attacks can begin,
motivated us to change the position of the nodes (the structure
of the tree remained the same, we just moved the nodes to
different layers) based on the description of the attack steps.
Our aim was to categorise the layers of trees similarly to the
Intrusion Kill Chains stages. Attack steps describing related
type of activity were placed in the same layer. We identified
five different classes in which we categorised the layers of the
attack-pattern trees, namely normal behaviour; covering tracks;
weaponisation; attack; and outcome. We further dichotomised
attack steps to those that could potentially be observed au-
tomatically with the use of a detection system, and to those
that require human intervention. To illustrate this information,
we coloured green the attack steps that can be detected by
machines and red the attack steps where human intervention
is needed.
Figure V-B presents the attack-pattern tree where the aim
of the attack is IP theft. We analysed ten case studies of IP
theft, six of which derived from CMU-CERT [1,11] and four
from a document produced by CPNI [?]. All the case studies
ended up in the attacker publishing/sharing sensitive company
files to unauthorised parties. There are eight different pathways
depicted in the tree that attackers followed in the case studies:
• (AS75; AS6; AS11; AS77; AS27; AS58)
• (AS75; AS6; AS27: AS58)
• (AS75; AS6; AS11; AS27; AS58)
• (AS75: AS15: AS76; AS27: AS58)
• (AS75; AS5; AS27; AS58)
• (AS75; AS6; AS11; AS27; AS22; AS58)
• (AS69; AS7; AS53; AS58)
• (AS75; AS74; AS7; AS27; AS58)
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Fig. 8. The attack-pattern tree for publishing company files to unauthorised
Websites.
The lengthiest path (AS75; AS6; AS11; AS77; AS27;
AS58) is for the attackers to log in using their credentials
and obtain access to files that are within their privileges. The
following step would require to coerce a colleague to provide
them access to additional files that they are not allowed to
obtain. Then they would use the company’s systems to down-
load the files into a portable device, before sharing these with
unauthorised third parties. In certain cases, insiders decided
to delete the files from companies’ systems after downloading
them, suggesting an extra motivation for blackmail or sabotage
(AS75; AS6; AS11; AS27; AS22; AS58). Shorter alternatives
(AS75; AS15; AS76; AS27; AS58) require the installation of
a ‘back-door’ in company’s systems to avoid logging in with
their personal or their colleagues credentials. The shortest path
(AS75; AS6; AS27; AS58 or AS75; AS5; AS27; AS58) can
be achieved if the attackers have already privileged access to
these files, a fact that may imply a person with managerial
role. Then they can either access and browse normal volumes
of files, as the AS6 step suggests or browse files that they
do not usually visit. There were cases where attackers due to
their roles were able to produce fake access credentials and
elevate their access credentials, before copying files (AS75;
AS6; AS11; AS27; AS22; AS58). All of the aforementioned
paths require the use of portable devices to exfiltrate the data
from the company. There is, however, another attack where the
insiders get possession of physical files, such as printouts. To
achieve this, they access rooms using a colleagues’ credentials
to obtain sensitive files stored there. It is worth-noting that
most of the attack steps could potentially be recognised by
a detection system. There are only two cases where human
intervention is required to determine whether attackers have
used this step. These are AS11 where another employee was
coerced to participate in the attack and AS53 where physical
files were stolen.
Attack-pattern trees capture the spectrum of all the attacks
described in the case studies. We endeavoured to identify
trends in these attacks, by highlighting the most prevalent
attack paths. For every attack-pattern tree we identify the most
commonly followed path and we present the number of case
studies in which this path occurred. In Figure V-B for example,
the number next to the outcome step denotes that the prevalent
path occurred in five out of six case studies. More specifically,
in five of these cases insiders reached their goal by following
step AS27 and only once the followed the AS53 step. We
illustrate this trend by making the line connecting AS27 to
AS58 thicker. The other lines remain the same because we
had five different attackers and they followed five different
paths to reach to AS27.
In total we have identified 19 different attack-pattern trees
for cases related to fraud threats and one attack-pattern tree
for cases related to IP thefts. We have made use of 44
different attack steps to design the attack-pattern trees and we
have classified all the attack steps used in these to machine
detectable and human intervention ones. Table V-B provides
the list of the attack steps considered in this deliverable
that would require some form of human intervention for
their detection. The attack steps which can be obtained by
automated processes will be outlined in the next Section VI.
We will provide details on how our detection system could
capture these steps based on features derived from a user’s
profile, and anomaly metrics that relate deviations of observed
features to suspected patterns of attack. All the attack-pattern
trees can be found in the Appendix ?? section.
Attack Step Description
AS9
Building a close relationship with
company’s clients
AS11
Coercing workers with access to
company files to assist in an attack
AS17 Creating fake documentation in general
AS19 Creating fake receipts
AS32
Filling illegitimate claims (i.e. for
expenses)
AS42 Masquerading as a worker at a platform
AS46
Opening illegitimate accounts using
clients’ information
AS50 Physical theft of company files
AS51 Physical theft of company funds
AS52 Physical theft of co-workers’ property
AS53
Physical theft of files/ computer systems/
property belonging to company’s clients
AS54
Physical theft of funds belonging to
company’s clients
AS59
Removing security tags from company
property or files
Fig. 9. Table illustrating the attack steps which would require some form of
human intervention in order to be detected
VI. APPLYING ATTACK PATTERNS FOR THREAT DETECTION
Having defined the patterns of attacks that have been
observed in reported case studies of insider threat, here we now
show how attack steps could be identified through detection
capabilities. In the prototype detection system that we have
constructed as part of the CITD project, we define a series of
anomaly metrics. An anomaly metric indicates the amount of
deviation that is currently being observed for a particular ob-
servation type. An observation type may exist for a particular
activity, for instance, login anomaly or email anomaly, or for
a particular type of observation that can be made, such as a
new anomaly, or a role anomaly.
A. Overview of a detection system
By constructing user and role-based profiles, we can extract
various features that define device and activity usage patterns,
including hourly and daily usage frequency, new observations
of activities and attributes across multiple devices, and new
activities that do not exist within the profiles of their associated
role. Our prototype detection system constructs anomalies
based on each of the proposed metrics, by analysing the
amount of deviation that is exhibited by features that relate
to that particular anomaly type. The anomaly metrics that are
used in the current detection prototype are as given below:
• Anomalies based on the how the user acts for individual
activities:
– Login anomaly
– Login duration anomaly
– Logoff anomaly
– USB inserstion anomaly
– USB duration anomaly
– USB removal anomaly
– Email anomaly
– Web anomaly
– File anomaly
• Anomalies based on how the user acts across different
activities:
– This anomaly — where an anomaly has been ob-
served on ‘this’ device.
– Any anomaly — where an anomaly has been ob-
served on ‘any’ device.
– New anomaly — where an anomaly has been trig-
gered by a ‘new’ observation.
– Hourly anomaly — where an anomaly has been
triggered by a time-based observation.
– Number anomaly — where an anomaly has been
triggered by a count-based observation.
– User anomaly — where an anomaly has been trig-
gered by a ‘user’ comparison.
– Role anomaly — where an anomaly has been trig-
gered by a ‘role’ comparison.
– Total anomaly — where an anomaly has been ob-
served over all observed features.
By considering the range of different anomalies that can
occur on singular activities, and across multiple activities, this
provides a means to relate anomaly alerts to a particular pattern
of activity. For example, consider a user who scores highly
on USB inserstion anomaly, File anomaly, New anomaly,
Hourly anomaly, User anomaly, and Role anomaly. Here, it
could be established that the user has accessed files on the
system that are new for this user, and inserted a USB storage
device that again is new for the user, at an unusual time of
the day, which differs significantly from how other users in
the role are acting, and how this user has acted previously.
Clearly, this is a user who should be flagged by the system,
and the alert of different anomaly metrics allows the analyst
to quickly establish not only that they have been flagged, but
also why they have been flagged.
B. Case study
We will apply our attack-pattern tree for a case study to
illustrate how the attack-steps can be linked and used for
insider threat detection. Towards this end, we will use the IP
theft scenario and the .
Having specified the different types of anomaly metrics that
we currently cater for, we show how the proposed attack steps
can be related to these anomaly metrics. In particular, we
demonstrate how the attack steps related to the fraud and IP
theft case studies can be captured by the proposed anomaly
metrics.
• AS2 - Accessing restricted company locations to which
the actor has authorisation (Abnormal hours): We need to
consider logon data from physical access to company’s
facilities, provided that this data exists. We expect an
anomaly on the login hours to be flagged.
• AS3 - Accessing restricted company locations to which
the actor has authorisation (Abnormal access): We need to
consider logon data from physical access to company’s
facilities, provided that this data exists. We expect an
anomaly on the login times to be flagged.
• AS4 - Accessing restricted company locations to which
the actor has no authorisation: We need to consider
logon data from physical access to company’s facilities,
provided that this data exists. We expect an anomaly on
the login rooms to be flagged.
• AS6 - Accessing company file or information to which
the actor has authorisation (Normal access): We need
to consider logon times to all machines and activities
on files. Since it is a normal behaviour we expect no
anomaly metrics on the user role. We might have anomaly
behaviour if compared to role anomaly.
• AS7 - Accessing sensitive company files or information to
which the actor has no authorisation: We need to consider
the logon data and the activity on the files for users. We
expect an anomaly metric on file to flag up.
• AS14 - Connecting portable devices to company work-
stations: We need to consider insertion of USB on device.
We expect USB insertion anomaly.
• AS15 - Creating back-doors in company systems to facil-
itate later attacks: We need to consider data from program
installations, if available, and activities on machines. We
expect activities for any device anomaly.
• AS16 - Creating fake access credentials: We need to
consider logon data on any devices. We expect a login
anomaly to any device since this is going to be considered
as a new user login.
• AS21 - Deleting/editing system log files: We need to
consider data about activities on devices. We expect file
anomalies and any device anomalies per user and per role.
• AS22 - Deleting company files or information: We need
to consider data regarding activities for any device. We
expect a file anomaly and an anomaly for activity for any
device, for this device, for user and for role.
• AS23 - Denying legitimate access to company files or
information. We need to consider data about obtaining
access to files and data about denying access to files. We
expect a file anomaly permission.
• AS27 - Downloading sensitive company files or infor-
mation to portable devices: We need to consider data
about files, activities on these files and insertion of USB
devices. We expect We expect USB insertion anomaly, a
USB duration anomaly and a USB removal anomaly.
• AS28 - Emailing sensitive company files or information
to other unauthorised parties: We need to consider email
activity. We expect an email anomaly either on the size
of attachments attribute or on the recipient of the email
field.
• AS29 - Emailing sensitive company files or information
from work accounts to personal email addresses: We need
to consider email activity. We expect an email anomaly
both on the size of attachments attribute and on the
recipient of the email field.
• AS30 - Emailing sensitive company files or information
to competitor’s email addresses: We need to consider
email activity. We expect an email anomaly both on the
size of attachments attribute and on the recipient of the
email field.
• AS39 - Installing/placing malicious programs: We need
to consider data from program installations, if available,
and activities on machines. We expect activities for any
device anomaly.
• AS44 - Misappropriating company’s finances via elec-
tronic means: We need to consider activity on devices
data. There should be an activity anomaly on device when
compared to the role activity.
• AS45 - Misappropriating the finances of the company’s
clients via electronic means: We need to consider activity
on devices data. There should be an activity anomaly on
device when compared to the role activity.
• AS56 - Processing illegitimate or inappropriate trans-
actions or requests that are unauthorised: We need to
consider activities on machines. We expect both user and
role anomalies on any device for actions.
• AS57 - Publishing/sharing company access credentials to
unauthorised parties or Web sites. We need to consider
logon data from all devices. Anomalies on user should be
raised when it comes to new devices used and activities
completed to these.
• AS58- Publishing/sharing sensitive company files or in-
formation to unauthorised parties or the Web: We need to
consider data from activities and files for any machine.
We expect file and activity anomalies for any device both
per user and per role.
• AS60 - Searching for and identifying vulnerable company
clients. We need to consider data on activities and, if
available, on searching for files. We expect a file anomaly
when compared against role file activity.
• AS69 - Using co-workers’ credentials: We need to con-
sider logon data on any devices. We expect to detect
a new user using this device anomaly. We may detect
logon from two different devices simultaneously from IP
addresses that are in very different locations.
• AS70: Using/execution of malicious code for an attack or
as a platform for another attack: We need to consider data
from program installations, if available, and activities on
machines. We expect activities for any device anomaly.
• AS71 - Using credentials belonging to company’s clients.
We need to consider logon data on any devices. We expect
to detect a new user using this device anomaly.
• AS72 - Using credentials from formerly held roles: We
need to consider logon data for all devices and the
’username’ used for the login. Any login anomaly as well
as a role anomaly should be flagged.
• AS73 - Using credentials from shared accounts: We need
to consider data for logon details. Since the logon from
shared account would be considered as a single user, we
should be looking for anomalies in time duration and
usage of the account in different devices for all users and
roles.
• AS74 - Using credentials which are faked or forged: We
need to consider logon data for all devices, the ’username’
used for the login as well as activities in devices. Any
login anomaly, file anomaly as well as a role anomaly
should be flagged.
• AS75 - Using own credentials: We need to consider logon
data. We do not expect an indicative anomalous metric.
• AS76 - Using remote access or VPN to access company’s
systems: We need to consider logon data and duration
from VPN accounts. We should expect a VPN anomaly.
• AS77 - Using the company’s computer systems without
authorisation or contrary to company policy: We need to
consider new activity for any device for this specific user.
An anomaly on any device per user should be raised.
VII. DISCUSSION
It is evident that there isn’t a unique anomaly identifier
for every attack step. We expect, however, that when we
will enrich the attributes of our features, most of the attack
steps would be captured by different anomaly metrics. We
need to emphasise that the anomaly metrics presented in this
report are governed by the data sources that we currently work
with. As further data sources become available, the extent of
the anomaly metrics can be expanded. Our work with Cisco
shows that they maintain logs for VPN access, and so we
will incorporate a vpn anomaly. We would also expand the
anomaly types related to files, to support the use of access,
modification, creation and deletion. Physical building access
will also be included based on logs that capture badge swipe
activity for door entry, defined as badge anomaly. Other data
sources would also support the metrics that we have used to
date for the synthetic data examples.
Linking attack steps to anomaly metrics provides suc-
cessfully the context for capturing behaviours of interest.
Another dimension that can be extremely useful though, is
the possibility of analysing the sequence of steps from the
attack-pattern trees to determine new anomaly scores. As
insiders obtain better knowledge of the detection systems in
place and endeavour to mask their abnormal behaviours, it
is getting more difficult to compute effective anomaly scores.
What may not flag as an anomaly when considering anomaly
metrics individually, can be considered suspicious if a specific
group of anomaly metrics are simultaneously high but not
significantly enough to constitute an anomaly. Consider the
IP theft example and the attack-pattern tree presented in
Figure V-B. An attacker may choose to access with her/his
credentials sensitive files, download them to a portable device
and send a small portion of them via email to unauthorised
parties. A sophisticated attack could be constructed in such
a way that the size of the attachment of the email may not
be significant enough to raise a flag at the email anomaly,
the attacker may insert only once the portable device to a
machine that he/she usually connects to such devices and the
downloaded files may be frequently browsed by him/her. If
such an attack were to occur it would have been undetected
by a system that considers anomaly metrics in isolation to each
other. The fact, however, that an employee has scored high in
three of the anomaly metrics (insert device, file download and
email) and his actions are in such a sequence that form the
identified path on the attack-pattern tree can be significant and
constitute a specific type of anomalous behaviour.
Attack-pattern trees comprise an effective framework which
rationalises anomaly metrics but also provides further guidance
for how combinations of metrics can be further combined in
order to enhance analyst’s understanding, and to enhance the
capabilities of detecting insider behaviour.
A. Challenges for the framework
We have designed the framework to facilitate the under-
standing and consideration of the factors associated with an
insider threat and the execution of an attack. By characterising
previously executed or publicly documented attacks with our
framework, one could begin to assess the prevalence of spe-
cific elements (e.g., Personality Characteristics, Psychological
States and Attack details) and their values (e.g., Social Skill
Problems, Disgruntlement or Stress), towards identifying pat-
terns of attack.
There are, however, a few challenges to the use of the
framework now and in the future. One of these difficulties
is in characterising aspects within insider threats, especially
when trying to understand the mind-set of the individual
that attacks. For instance, their intent can be based on both
static and dynamic personality traits. Static traits such as
the traditional OCEAN profiles [35] can be measured by
using established psychological surveys that are quite often
used by HR staff. Unfortunately, the reality is that it is
difficult to definitively know whether information provided
by surveys is truly accurate, particularly if the subject is
already non-compliant. Dynamic traits are even more difficult
to identify, and mostly can only be inferred by qualified staff
(e.g., personnel in HR with an appropriate psychology or
psychoanalysis background) from the actions of the individual;
not all companies will have such specialist staff at hand.
Often there is the possibility of relying on the co-operation of
other individuals within the organisation to report suspicious
behaviour observed in the workplace, or outside of it. The
problem here, however, is that this may be highly subjective
or pure conjecture. With all of these aspects in mind, in reality,
it is extremely difficult to effectively collect useful data, and
in many cases, this even applies after an attack.
As an exercise in understanding how much data – especially
on the precursors to an attack – is currently captured in
reported cases, we reflected on the 179 cases we gathered
throughout our study. From our analysis, we found that there
were some parts of the framework that were well-documented
in all cases, but others that were mostly unknown. For instance,
Attack and Organisation Characteristics, as well as Actor
Roles, Types and Relationship States are typically well-known
elements; these were present in over 90% of the cases. To some
extent, this is unsurprising, given that it is easily observable
data: i.e., the attack is typically now known and the perpetrator
has been identified. In the cases where this information was
unknown, the attacks featured unknown attackers or accidents
that were unattributable, including loss, theft or sabotage.
On the other hand, elements where data was sparse included
Personality Characteristics (present in only 32% of cases),
Historical Behaviour (11% of cases), Attitude towards Work
(31% of cases), and Observed Cyber (8%) and Physical (37%)
Behaviours. The first point that one will note is that a number
of these elements are closely associated with the insider’s
mind-set. Our findings here, therefore, reiterate the difficulty
in gathering this psychological information on insider threats;
in many of the cases, we found that much more emphasis
was placed on the attack itself, rather than on gathering data
regarding indicators or precursors in order to learn from it.
An encouraging finding with regards to the framework itself
was that elements such as Precipitating Event, Psychological
State and Motivation to Attack were either very often stated
or easily inferrable from cases (present in 87%, 78% and
90% of cases respectively). This gives some hope in terms of
precursors to attack that are currently captured, and therefore
can be described and modelled, and later used for pattern
identification. More generally, this mapping of the full set of
case data has also been useful for the framework as it has
validated its ability to capture and describe a large set of data.
Although it is useful to have detailed information on em-
ployees to better engage and understand the insider threat, the
gathering of such information also raises issues about ethical
and legal usage of information. As stated in the UK Data
Protection Act, personal data can only be used for the specified
purposes that it was collected for. Therefore, an organisation
would need to declare the introduction of employee monitoring
to the individuals within the organisation, if they choose to
use information for this purpose. Employees may well show
resentment against the idea of monitoring, feeling that it
invades their privacy, or induces a lack of trust between the
organisation and them. Kiser et al. [46] and Greitzer et al.
[47] are two insightful articles that explore the ethical issues
with monitoring and its broader impact in the enterprise. If
companies do decide to engage in more comprehensive moni-
toring, it would be essential that they consider the impacts and
possibly even run educational campaigns to assure employees
that those who act within the acceptable behaviour for their
job role should not be alarmed or concerned.
As a final discussion point regarding the future development
of the framework, we address the issue of quantifying actions
and their impact. Foundational work in risk management
suggests that if an individual has motive, capability and
opportunity, then they are likely to conduct an attack. However,
a crucial question here is, what constitutes as ‘enough’ motive,
or ‘enough’ capability? Likewise, somebody may well exhibit
all these, and yet still choose not to attack. Much previous
literature also discusses the concept that if an individual is
disgruntled then they may choose to act out. Again though, it
is difficult to know just how disgruntled an individual needs
to become in order for them to pose a threat. Within our
framework, we do not aim to associate a particular value
with an element, such as high stress or medium-to-high
disgruntlement. Instead, we focus on defining and capturing
the relationships between elements, for instance, how their
psychological state will impact their motivation to attack. The
framework could then be used further to assess past attacks
for how often individuals have exhibited a particular set of
attributes and what the outcome of this was (e.g., how the
attack was initiated, or the flow of the attack). Such analysis,
once mature and supported by identified attack patterns, may
then allow one to infer the risk associated with observing a se-
ries of states within the framework. For example, if somebody
has previous history of disruption, their psychological state is
disgruntled, and they are about to be made redundant, then the
organisation may choose to take appropriate measures.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
TO DO
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